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The Established Regimes and 1992 is backed up by a system of compulsory insurance 
which also provides for a right of direct action against the 
person providing security.6 The current general capping of 
shipowner's liability in CLC 1992 is set at 59.7 million units 
of account.7 The shipowner's liability is complemented by li­
ability imposed on the International Oil Pollution Compen­
sation Funds [IOPC] [that is, 1971 and 1992] in terms of the 
Fund Convention 1971 and the Fund Convention 1992,8 to 
which oil receivers in member States contribute. The current 
maximum liability of the IOPC Fund 1992 is 135 million 
units of account which can in certain instances rise to 200 
million units of account;9 the limits contained in CLC 1992 
and the Fund Convention 1992 were raised in October 2000 
by the tacit amendment procedure contained in the Conven­
tions . 10 The Fund Convention 1971 will be cease to be in force 
on 24 May 2002; 11 as of 1 December 2001 the number of states
parties to the 1992 Fund Convention was seventy-four. 12 
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollu­
tion Damage 1969 [CLC 1969], the International Convention 
on the Establishment of an International Fund for Oil Pollu­
tion Damage 1971 [Fund Convention 1971], and their amend­
ing protocols of 1992,2 have, for a number of years, provid­
ed a largely effective framework for compensation for ship­
source oil pollution damage. CLC 1969/199i3 imposes strict 
but limited liability on a ship owner for damage caused by 
a spill of persistent oil from a tanker carrying persistent oil 
as cargo. The definition of ship has been slightly widened in 
the 1992 Civil Liability Convention Protocol.4 The shipown­
er's liability is subject to a number of exceptions including 
war and natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and 
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Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil liability for Oil Po11ution Damage, 1969; Protocol of 1992 to Amend 
the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Po11ution Damage, 1971. 
References to CLC 1992 constitute a reference to the consolidated text of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pol­
lution Damage 1992, as amended by the 1992 Protocol. 
CLC 1969 defined a ship as meaning 'any seagoing vessel and any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actua11y carrying oil in bulk 
as cargo' [Article I (I)]. This was widened in CLC 1992, and the same provision now states that 'ship' means 'any sea-going vessel 
and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship capable 
of carrying oil and other cargoes sha11 be regarded as a ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any voy­
age following such carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard.' 
Loe. cit., Art. III (2). 
Loe. cit., Article V II, paragraph 8. 
Loe. cit., Article V. Article V, paragraph 9(a) states that this unit of account is the Special Drawing Right as defined by the Interna­
tional Monetary Fund. 
References to the Fund Convention 1992 constitute a reference to the consolidated text of the International Convention on the Estalr 
lishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 , as amended by the 1992 Protocol. 
Fund Convention 1992, Article 4, paragraph 4.
10 Resolutions adopting these amendments are reproduced at pages 4 7 et seq. of Texts of the 1992 Conventions on Liability and Com­
pensation for Oil Pollution Damage, [2001 Edition].Amendments will come into force on 1 / 1 1 /2003, 'unless prior to 1 May 2002 not 
less than one quarter of the States which were contracting States to the respective Conventions on 18 October 2000 have communi­
cated to the International maritime Organization that they do not accept these amendments". [IOPC Fund 1992, Text of the 1992 Con­
ventions on Liability and Oil Pollution Damage, 2001 Edition, p.3]
11 
IOPC Fund 1971 Documentation, 71FUND/A.24/ 4 [ 1  August 2001].
12 
Source: www.iopcfund.org [1 0/ 12/2001]. Number of states parties to CLC 1992 was seventy-eight as of 1 / 12/2001 [ibid]. Malta acceded 
to CLC 1992 and the Fund Convention 1992 on 6 January 2000 and the said Conventions entered into force for Malta on 6 January 2001 . 
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The liability of the Funds is strict and limited in all cases, 
and is also subject to a number of defences which are not as 
extensive as those in CLC 1969/1992. The Erika incident,13 
in particular, however has highlighted the possibility of dam­
ages from a spill which exceed the limit available under the 
1992 Conventions. The European Commission proposed, in 
the wake of that incident, a regulation of the European Par­
liament and of the Council on the establishment of a fund 
for the compensation of oil pollution damage in European 
waters and related measures. 14 Such a fund would lead to a 
regional solution; however the international maritime com­
munity deliberating within the framework of both the IOPC 
Fund and the International Maritime Organization [IMO] is 
actively considering the possibility of establishing a third 
tier of liability for oil pollution damage. In September 2001 
the 1992 Fund Assembly considered a revised draft Proto­
col 15 establishing a Supplementary Compensation Fund. This 
supplementary fund would be very closely linked to the ex­
isting 1992 IOPC Fund. Indeed the draft protocol adopts the 
same definition of ship, person, owner, oil, pollution damage, 
preventive measures and incident.16 The raison d'etre of the 
Supplementary Fund is spelt out in Article 4: 
The Supplementary Fund shall pay compensation to any per­
son suffering pollution damage if such person has been unable 
to obtain full and adequate compensation for an established 
claim for such damage under the terms of the 1992 Fund Con­
vention, because the damage exceeds the applicable limit of 
compensation laid down in .. .in respect of any one incident.17 
It has been suggested that the maximum available from the 
Supplementary Fund will be one billion US dollars; 18 it has, 
furthermore been suggested that a diplomatic conference 
will address the issue in 2003 .19
The International Convention on Liability and Compen­
sation for Damage in Connexion with the Carriage of Haz-
13 France, 12 December 1999. 
14 Brussels, 6.12.2000, COM (2000) 802 final.
ardous and Noxious Substances· by Sea 1996. [HNS Conven­
tion ].20 
The CLC and the Fund Convention regimes do not pro­
vide compensation for damage caused by a ship-source spill 
of hazardous substances other than oil as defined in those 
Conventions.21 The problem is addressed in the HNS Con­
vention of 1996, which is still not in force. This Convention 
makes provision for a regime of compensation for damage 
caused by the carriage of hazardous substances on ships. Strict 
but limited liability, as in CLC 1969/ 1992, is channelled on 
to the owner, restrictively defined , and the Convention also 
provides for the setting up of an HNS Fund on lines similar to 
the IOPC Fund 1992. Despite the attractions of the implemen­
tation of this Convention,22 only limited progress has been
made in this direction, and this is probably due to the com­
plexity of administering the Convention. In October 1999 the 
Legal Committee of the IMO decided to include the imple­
mentation of the HNS Convention as part of its programme, 
and a correspondence group was established to this effect. 
In October 2001 the 1992 Fund Assembly gave instructions 
to the IOPC Fund 1992 Director for the development of a 
system designed 'to assist States and potential contributors in 
the identification and reporting of contributing cargo under the 
HNS Convention' .23 Furthermore the Assembly renewed in­
structions to the Fund Director 'to carry out the administrative 
tasks necessary for setting up the HNS Fund' .24 
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker 
Oil Pollution Damage, 2001 [The Bunker Oil Pollution Dam­
age Convention 2001].25 
Another aspect of the established oil pollution regime 
which can be considered to be a drawback is that the defin­
ition of a 'ship' in both CLC 1969/ 1992 and the Fund Con­
vention 1971 / 1992 largely restricts the application of the 
Convention to tankers. A number of States, including the 
15 This draft protocol is entitled 'Draft Protocol of 200_ to Supplement the International Convention on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992'. 
16 IOPC Fund 1992 Documentation, 92FUND/A.6/28,Annex I, article 1, paragraph 6. 
17 IOPC Fund 1992 Assembly Documentation, 92FUND/A.6/28 [19 October 2001],Annex I. 
18 O'Mahony, IMO plans $1 bn 'third tier'for oil spill payouts, 22 November 2001. 
19 Ibid. 
20 IMO documentation: LEG/CONF. 10/8/2, 9 May 1996. 
21 CLC 1992,Article I, paragraph 5; Fund Convention 1992,Article 1(2). 
22 The HNS Convention is not in force. It will enter into force 18 months after the date on which the following conditions are fulfilled: 
a. at least twelve States, including four States each with not less than 2 million units of gross tonnage, have expressed their consent to
be bound by it, and
b. the Secretary-General has received information in accordance with article 43 that those persons in such States who would be liable
to contribute pursuant to article 18, paragraphs l (a) and (c) have received during the preceding calendar year a total quai;ltity of at
least 40 million·tonnes of cargo contributing to the general account. . .  [Article 46].
23 IOPC Fund 1992 Assembly Documentation, 92FUND/A.6/28 [19 October 2001], §28.5. 
24 IOPC Fund 1992 Assembly Documentation, 92FUND/A.6/28 [19 October 2001], §28.8 . 
25 IMO documentation LEG/CONF. 12/19, 27 March 2001. See, further, Gauci, G. & Pace, J., 'Bunker Oil Pollution Damage Conven­
tion adopted at IMO', Shipping and Transport Lawyer International, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2001, p. 17. 
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United Kingdom, took unilateral action to impose strict li­
ability in relation to bunker spills from non-CLC vessels .26 
On March 23, 2001, a Convention entitled the Internation­
al Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage 2001 was adopted at IMO. According to article 14 
of the said Convention, the Convention will go into force 
one year following the date on which eighteen States, includ­
ing five States each with ships whose combined gross tonnage 
is not less than one million, have either signed it without reser­
vation as to ratification, acceptance or approval or have de­
posited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or ac­
cession with the Secretary-GeneraI.27 
This Convention adopts the broad structure of the 1992 Civil 
Liability Convention in that it imposes a regime of strict but 
limited liability accompanied by compulsory insurance. As 
in CLC 1992, the ship owner is exempted from liability in a 
number of instances, including instances where the conta­
mination damage is caused by war and hostilities, and a nat­
ural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible 
character.28 However, there is one major innovation in the
Convention; this relates to the channelling of liability. Where­
as CLC 1969/1992 applies a restrictive definition of shipown­
er,29 the Bunker Oil Pollution Damage Convention 2001
defines a 'shipowner' as meaning 'the owner, including the 
registered owner, bareboat charterer, manager and operator 
of the ship' .30 In tum 'registered owner' is defined as mean­
ing 'the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship 
or, in the absence of registration, the person or persons own­
ing the ship.'3 1 The wide definition of 'ship owner' is a very
interesting development; it bears similarities to the definition 
of 'responsible person' in the United States Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990.32 It is most likely that the term susceptible to the
widest interpretation is 'operator' which can include inter alia
mortgagees in possession and salvors. The possibility that a 
salvor might be deemed to be an operator may support the 
view that the provisions of the Convention may constitute 
a disincentive to salvors; this problem is compounded by 
the fact that the Bunker Oil Pollution Damage Convention 
2001 does not contain the equivalent of article III( 4) of 
26 See section 154 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 [ 1995 c. 21]. 
27 See, further, Article 14(2) of the same Convention. 
28 Loe. cit., Article 3, paragraph 3. 
29 Loe. cit., Article I. 
30 Loe. cit., Article 1 , paragraph 3. 
31 Loe. cit., Article 1, paragraph 4: 
32 Public Law 101-380,August 18, 1990, §1001 (32). 
33 See also Article 7 (5) of the HNS Convention 1996. 
34 IMO documentation LEG/CONF. 12/DC/3 22 March 2001. 
35 
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CLC 1992 which largely provides an immunity from liability 
for pollution damage in relation to salvors.33 After a long de­
bate on the issue prior to the adoption of the Convention at 
an IMO diplomatic conference in March 2001, the matter was 
resolved on the basis of the text of a resolution which recom­
mends 'that persons taking reasonable measures to prevent 
or minimize the effects of oil pollution be exempt from lia­
bility unless the liability in question results from their per­
sonal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause dam­
age, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage 
would probably result', and recommended further 'that States 
consider the provisions of Article 7, paragraphs 5(a), (b), 
(d), (e) and (f) of the International Convention on Liability 
and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Car­
riage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996 
as a model for their legislation.'34 It may be noted that the
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage Convention 2001 imposes a 
duty to insure liability only on the registered owner of the 
vessel; operators and bareboat charterers have no such oblig­
ation.35 
As in the case of the limitation regimes adopted in CLC 
1992 and in the HNS Convention 1996, the regime of limi­
tation of liability suggested by the Bunker Oil Pollution Dam­
age Convention 2001 - the Convention on Limitation of Li­
ability for Maritime Claims, 1976, as amended36 - provides 
for a virtually unbreakable right of limitation of liability. 
Article 4 of that Convention provides that [a] 
person shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved 
that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission, com­
mitted with the intent to cause such loss, or recklessly and 
with knowledge that such loss would probably result. 
Common Problems. 
There are a number of common problems in the above men­
tioned three compensatory regimes. These include in partic­
ular the issue of compensability or otherwise of damage to 
the environment. All three systems provide that 'compen­
sation for impairment of the environment other than loss of 
Loe. cit., Article 7, paragraph 1. 
36 See Resolution on Limitation of Liability - IMO documentation LEG/CONF.12/DC/2 [22 March 200 l]. 
VOLUME XVIII 113 
·
THE CHANGING PARAMETERS OF COMPENSATION FOR SHIP-SOURCE P OLLUTION DAMAGE 
profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of rea­
sonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or 
to be undertaken' .37 Loss of profit gives rise to a particular
problem in common law systems, and specifically the extent 
to which the rule -relating to non-recovery for pure econom­
ic loss (normally applied in the context of damages caused 
by a negligent act)-operates with reference to a national law 
implementing an international convention and imposing strict 
liability. The IOPC Funds, in their Claims Manuals, have de­
lineated various criteria for compensability of economic loss.38 
Examples of instances where pure economic loss has been 
allowed by the IOPC Fund include: claims by self-employed 
fish-porters and net makers for loss of income indirectly caused 
by a spill;39 claims of a car repair firm which lost business 
as a result of the closure of an area to ensure free movement 
in connection with preventive measures;40 claims for loss by 
fish processing plants deprived of the supply of fish from an 
exclusion zone.41 However a number of claims for pure eco­
nomic loss arising from the Braer oil spi1142 have been recent­
ly addressed by the Scottish courts. In the case of Landcatch 
Ltd v. IOPC Fund,43 the claim related to pure economic loss 
arising from the non-materialization of expected contracts, 
between Landcatch Ltd -producers of smolt -and salmon 
farmers, due to the declaration of emergency orders prohibit­
ing the use, landing and supply of fish from the designated 
affected area. Recovery was not allowed on a number of 
grounds by both the court of first instance and the appellate 
court. In particular, Lord Cullen, at the appellate stage, stat­
ed that he arrived at his conclusion 
by applying considerations similar, though not identical, to those 
which have led to the development of a rule against such claims 
at common law.44 
Similarly in P & 0 Scottish Ferries Ltd v. Braer Corporation 
and Another,45 the claimants, providers of passenger and 
freight ferry services, provided the sole ferry passenger ser­
vice between Shetland (where the spill occurred) and the 
mainland. It was stated in the judgement by Lord Gill, in 
the court of first instance, that the losses claimed in that case 
were no more than an indirect consequence of adverse public­
ity affecting the image of Shetland as a source of fish and fish 
products and as a holiday destination.46 
The issue of compensability in relation to reinstatement mea­
sures and also post-spill environmental studies has been ad­
dressed by the Third Intersessional Working Group estab­
lished by the IOPC Fund, which submitted a number of pro­
posals to the sixth session of the Assembly of the 1992 IOPC 
Fund;47 these matters will be further addressed at the next 
Assembly of the IOPC Fund 1992.48 
Conclusion. 
The Bunker Oil Pollution Damage Convention of 2001 fills 
one substantial lacuna in the international scheme for ship­
source oil pollution damage. It is difficult to predict with any 
reasonable degree of accuracy when that Convention or the 
HNS Convention 1996 will come into force. Until that time 
serious lacunas will remain, and compensation for bunker 
spills and hazardous chemicals will have to be addressed by 
37 
See: CLC 1992, article I, paragraph 6; Fund Convention 1992, article 1, paragraph 2; HNS Convention, article 1, paragraph 6; Bunkers 
Convention Article 1, paragraph 9. 
38 The current IOPC Fund 1992 Claims Manual [June 2000] provides that: 
Claims for pure economic loss are admissible only if they are for loss or damage caused by contamination. The starting point is the 
pollution, not the incident itself. 
To qualify for compensation for pure economic loss, there must be a reasonable degree of proximity between the contamination and 
the loss or damage sustained by the claimant. A claim is not admissible for the sole reason that the loss or damage would not have 
occurred had the oil spill not happened. When considering whether the criterion of reasonable proximity is fulfilled, the following 
elements are taken into account: 
* the geographical proximity between the claimant's activity and the contamination
* the degree to which a claimant was economically dependent on an affected resource
* the extent to which a claimant had alternative sources of supply or business opportunities
* the extent to which a claimant's business formed an integral part of the economic activity within the area affected by the spill.
The 1992 Fund also takes into account the extent to which a claimant was able to mitigate his loss. [loc. cit., pp. 21-22]. 
39 IOPC Fund Executive Committee documentation, FUND/EXC.35.10, 8 June 1993. §3.3.18. 
40 IOPC Fund Executive Committee documentation, FUND/EXC. 36.10, 5 October 1993, §3.3.8-9.
41 IOPC Fund Executive Committee documentation, FUND/EXC.34.9, 12 March 1993, §3.4.14-15.
42 United Kingdom, 5 January 1993. 
43 Court of Session, Inner House (Second Division), 19 May 1999, [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 316. See, further, Gauci, G., 'Ship-source Oil 
Pollution Damage and Recovery for Relational Economic Loss', Journal of Business Law, 2000, pp. 356-361. 
44 [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 316 at 329.
45 [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 535, per Lord Gill. [Court of Session, Outer House, January 7, 1999]. 
46 
[1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 535 at 540. 
47 See IOPC Fund 1992 Assembly Documentation, 92FUND/A.6/28 [19 October 2001]. 
48 IOPC Fund 1992 Assembly Documentation, 92FUND/A.6/28 [19 October 2001], §6.43. 
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general basic domestic laws. Whereas it may be quite straight­
forward for some legal systems to impose strict and limited 
liability on a ship owner in relation to bunker spills or spills 
of hazardous chemicals, the benefits of an effective fund - such 
as the HNS Fund - remain inaccessible without internation­
al implementation. 
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